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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BURDEN OF PROOF AT VOLUNTARINESS HEARING
TO DETERMINE THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A CONFESSION-The United States
Supreme Court has held that the prosecution at a voluntariness hearing
to determine the admissibility of a challenged confession must prove
voluntariness at least by a preponderance of the evidence, and that a
stricter standard of proof is unnecessary.
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
Lego was tried for armed robbery. The evidence introduced against him
at trial included a confession which he had made to police after arrest
and while in custody at the station house. When Lego challenged the
voluntariness of the confession, the trial judge conducted a hearing
out of the jury's presence. Lego testified that he had been beaten, while
the police denied any beating or threats. The trial judge decided in
favor of the police and ruled that the confession was voluntary and
admissible. Although the judge had made no mention of the standard
he used, Illinois law permitted a preponderance standard at a voluntari-
ness hearing.
On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the con-
viction.' Four years later Lego sought a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
which denied relief on the merits.2 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed.3
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari4 to resolve the
question whether the fact finder at a coercion hearing must determine
the voluntariness of a confession by a stricter standard of proof than
a preponderance of the evidence.
Justice White, speaking for the majority, stated that the purpose
that a voluntariness hearing, required by Jackson v. Denno,5 is de-
signed to serve, has nothing to do with improving the reliability of
jury verdicts, or with implementing the presumption of innocence. 6
1. People v. Lego, 32 Ill. 2d 76, 203 N.E.2d 875 (1965).
2. United States ex rel. Lego v. Pate, 308 F. Supp. 38 (N.D. Ii1. 1970).
3. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's affirmance is unreported. Lego v. Pate,
No. 18313 (7th Cir., Oct. 8, 1970).
4. 401 U.S. 992 (1971).
5. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
6. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 486 (1972).
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Therefore, it was not inconsistent with In re Winship7 to determine
voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence. The
Court also rejected the petitioner's argument that evidence offered
against a defendant at a criminal trial and challenged on constitutional
grounds must be determined admissible beyond a reasonable doubt in
order to give adequate protection to the values which the exclusionary
rules are designed to serve. The Court reasoned that the petitioner
had not demonstrated that admissibility rulings based on the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard were unreliable, and the Court
found it very doubtful that an escalation of the burden of proof would
be sufficiently productive to outweigh the public interest in placing
probative evidence before juries."
In a dissenting opinion, written by Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall,9 there was a marked disagree-
ment with the majority as to the application of Winship to a voluntari-
ness hearing. The dissent argued that the standard of proof required
for criminal conviction and that required for the admissibility of an
allegedly involuntary confession should be the same because both
present similar situations; that it is just as serious to admit involuntary
confessions as it is to convict innocent defendants. The dissent reached
such a conclusion by arguing that even though a higher standard of
proof necessarily results in the acquittal of more guilty men than would
a preponderance standard, the higher standard is necessary to preserve
our fundamental societal values. Likewise, even though a higher
standard of proof would mean that some voluntary confessions would
be excluded as involuntary, such a standard is necessary to provide
"concrete substance" for the fifth amendment's command against in-
voluntary self-condemnation. 10 Hence, by the use of such analogous
reasoning, the dissent concluded that a less strict burden at the volun-
tariness hearing than beyond a reasonable doubt would be a violation
of the mandate of Winship.
In Jackson, the Supreme Court decided that when a defendant
challenges the voluntariness of a confession, he has a right to a reliable
and clear-cut determination of voluntariness at a separate voluntariness
hearing out of the presence of the jury before the confession is ad-
7. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). This case ruled that the reasonable doubt standard was a
part of due process as well as a prime instrument for reducing the risk of conviction
by providing concrete substance for the presumption of innocence.
8. 404 U.S. at 489.
9. Id. at 491.
10. Id. at 495.
Vol. 11: 81, 1972
Recent Decisions
mitted into evidence." Actually Jackson settled very little, and it was
subsequently twisted, construed, read, and reread by various courts.12
Consequently, the state and federal courts adopted a variety of stan-
dards ranging from a preponderance of the evidence to proof beyond
a reasonable doubt,13 depending upon their interpretation of the rea-
sons for and the nature of the Jackson voluntariness hearing.
Subsequent to Jackson, those courts which required less than a rea-
sonable doubt standard viewed the voluntariness hearing as merely a
ruling on the admissibility of evidence which was not an essential
element of the crime to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order
to implement the presumption of innocence. 14 The Jackson hearing,
as interpreted by these courts, was a ruling on a preliminary matter
of admissibility. 5 Therefore, since the voluntariness of a confession
was hardly to be distinguished from any other preliminary evidentiary
matter of admissibility, a burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
seemed to be an unwarranted burden.16
However, other courts which have had occasion to consider the
matter after the Jackson decision have emphasized the view that a
Jackson voluntariness hearing has a much more crucial function than
a mere ruling on the admissibility of a preliminary matter. Under these
decisions, the devastating nature of a confession required that it be
admitted only when a high standard of proof is attained. 7 This point
was succinctly expressed in State v. Keiser:ts
Because of the persuasive character of a confession as evidence, it
would seem only fair to say that on the issue of voluntariness a
mere preponderance of the evidence should not satisfy the court.
It should be conceded that, in many instances, the impact of a
voluntary confession admitted into evidence is so devastating as
11. Jackson v. Denno, 378 US. 368 (1964).
12. Roe, The Quantum of Proof Required in Confessions, 6 GONZAGA L. REv. 35, 41-42
(1970).
13. See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 860a, 861 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as WiGMORE].
14. Commonwealth ex tel. Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 239 A.2d 426 (1968).
15. See Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145, 176 So. 2d 840 (1965); State v. Milow, 199 Kan.
576, 433 P.2d 538 (1967); Barnhart v. State, 5 Md. App. 222, 246 A.2d 280 (1968); State v.
White, 146 Mont. 226, 405 P.2d 761 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1023 (1966); State v.
Brewton, 238 Or. 590, 395 P.2d 874 (1964).
16. Clifton v. United States, 371 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1966). This case was subsequently
overruled by Pea v. United States, 397 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
17. See State v. Ragsdale, 249 La. 420, 187 So. 2d 427 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1029 (1967); State v. Yough, 49 N.J. 587, 231 A.2d 598 (1967); People v. Huntley, 15
N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965); State v. Thundershield, 83 S.D. 414,
160 N.W.2d 408 (1968).
18. 274 Minn. 265, 143 N.W.2d 75 (1966).
Duquesne Law Review
to almost assure a verdict of guilty. Under such circumstances, the
trial court takes an important part in making a fact determination.
That being the case, it would seem to us that the evidence of
voluntariness should be of such persuasive force as to satisfy the
court to a moral certainty or beyond a reasonable doubt . . .19
Such a view was obviously a recognition that the voluntariness hearing
relates to a matter which is usually the key item in the proof of
guilt, and thus deserving of a higher standard of proof than that
attributed to ordinary preliminary matters of admissibility; judicial
error at the voluntariness hearing could seriously impair the fairness
of the entire trial.20 Therefore, as another case concluded, the reason-
able doubt standard is, contrary to the majority in Lego, directed at
the preservation of the integrity of the fact-finding process in a jury
trial.21 This interpretation of the purposes which a Jackson hearing is
designed to serve gains decisive importance in jurisdictions following
the orthodox rather than the Massachusetts rule for determining the
voluntariness of confessions.22
Under the orthodox or Wigmore rule for determining voluntariness,
the issue of voluntariness is finally and solely decided by the trial
judge for admissibility while the jury considers voluntariness as affect-
ing only the weight and credibility of the confession.2 3 Another pro-
cedure utilized in other jurisdictions is the Massachusetts or "humane"
rule, in which the judge, after hearing evidence on the challenged
confession, gives his own answer to the coercion issue, admitting only
those confessions that he deems to be voluntary. The jury may then
judge the voluntariness issue anew and perhaps disagree with the
judge's determination and ignore it entirely.24 It can be seen that
under the orthodox method, the Jackson voluntariness hearing is
certain to have an extremely crucial impact on the character of the
entire trial.25
It is, therefore, puzzling why the Lego decision failed to adequately
distinguish between these two types of procedures in relation to the
19. Id. at 270, 143 N.W.2d at 79.
20. Developments in the Law of Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REv. 935, 1071 (1966).
21. Fernandez v. Beto, 281 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
22. See State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 P.2d 553 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 942
(1971).
23. Illinois, the jurisdiction of the Lego case, followed the orthodox rule.
24. WIGMoRE § 861.
25. See Clifton v. United States, 371 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion),
where the need for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt in an orthodox jurisdiction is
noted.
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burden of proof at the voluntariness hearing. For it may be suggested
that even though the Court found that the voluntariness hearing is
not designed to implement the presumption of innocence, the contrary
can actually be the case in an orthodox jurisdiction where the volun-
tariness hearing can be considered to be a distinct disadvantage if the
reasonable doubt standard is not required.26 Indeed, although some
of the cases cited in the majority opinion of Lego did not impose a
reasonable doubt standard at the voluntariness hearing, they required,
in compliance with the Massachusetts rule, that the issue be further
submitted for the jury's ultimate consideration.2 7 Therefore, it seems
that the reasonable doubt standard promulgated in Winship is satisfied
when, even though only the preponderance burden is required at the
voluntariness hearing, the confession is later found voluntary beyond a
reasonable doubt by the jury as a question of fact, or as an essential
element of guilt.28 The Lego Court should have recognized, at least,
that it is this dichotomy of procedures for determining voluntariness,
orthodox and Massachusetts, which ultimately should determine the
cruciality and importance of the voluntariness hearing, and hence the
burden of proof at that hearing.
The Supreme Court's rejection of Lego's alternative contention that
the reasonable doubt standard is necessary to give adequate protection
to those values of immunity from coercive police tactics and freedom
from involuntary self-incrimination, which the exclusionary rules are
designed to serve, reflects the Court's hesitance to place additional
barriers to the presentation of probative evidence before a jury.2 It
may perhaps be proposed that this attitude, which seems to be increas-
ingly dominant in the law of confessions, represents a desire to temper
the pro-defendant rules which frequently seem to abort the production
of probative evidence. It springs from a firm belief that even if Jack-
son's primary concern was the prevention of improper police conduct,
there is no strict legal policy which declares that police hands must be
26. See Justice Black's dissent in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), where he
criticized that Court's failure to decide the burden of proof to be required at the
voluntariness hearing.
27. See Barnhart v. State, 5 Md. App. 222, 246 A.2d 280 (1968); Commonwealth v.
White, 353 Mass. 409, 232 NYE.2d 335 (1967); State v. Brewton, 238 Ore. 590, 395 P.2d
874 (1964). In each of these cases, cited by the Court as applying a less strict standard
than beyond a reasonable doubt, the preponderance standard was permitted at the
voluntariness hearing but the issue of voluntariness was then submitted for the jury's
reconsideration.
28. See generally Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility
Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 317 (1954).
29. 404 US. at 489.
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slapped, unless they act properly beyond a reasonable doubt.30 Chief
Justice Burger voiced this belief earlier, in 1966, when as a member of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, he objected that
the number of usable confessions was dwindling to the vanishing point,
and "in the future trial judges will be evaluating only those utterances
of an accused which have already passed through the whole gamut of
screening processes outlined in McNab b,'3 1 Mallory, 2 Escobedo,18 Mas-
siah8 4 and Miranda35 ".8 6 Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Lego
not to impose a reasonable doubt standard at a Jackson voluntariness
hearing appears to have been a rather predictable ruling to facilitate
the admission of probative evidence. And so, the majority in Lego was
quite willing to de-emphasize one of the primary values of the ex-
clusionary rules which declared that it is the way that evidence is
obtained and not just its relevance which is of constitutional signifi-
cance to the fairness of a trial.37
In conclusion, the decision in Lego provided a much needed comple-
ment to the somewhat unfinished ruling in Jackson by clarifying the
prosecution's burden of proof at the voluntariness hearing. However,
Lego's failure to adequately distinguish between the two currently
used procedures for determining voluntariness places the defendant
in a disadvantaged position in an orthodox jurisdiction where he does
not have a "second crack" at the challenged confession. The majority
in Lego thus appears to have diminished the very importance of the
Jackson voluntariness hearing by relegating it to hardly more than a
preliminary hearing on the admissibility of an ordinary evidentiary
matter.
Paul R. Marks
30. 429 Pa. at 146, 239 A.2d at 429 (1968).
31. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
32. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
33. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 
(1964).
34. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
35. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
36. Clifton v. United States, 371 F.2d 354, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
37. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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